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This paper examines the interplay between the real and financial decisions of the competitive firm `a la Sandmo. 
Besides output price uncertainty, the firm faces additional sources of risk which are aggregated into an additive 
background risk. We show that the firm always chooses its optimal debt-equity ratio to minimize the weighted average 
cost of capital, irrespective of the risk attitude of the firm and the incidence of the multiple sources of uncertainty. Even 
though the introduction of the background risk aﬀects neither the optimal debt-equity ratio nor the marginal rate of 
technical substitution, it does have an adverse eﬀect on the output level of the firm. Furthermore, if capital is a normal 
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1. Introduction
The seminal work of Sandmo (1971) has inspired a great many papers examining
the theory of the competitive ﬁrm under output price uncertainty (see, e.g., Batra
and Ullah, 1974; Chavas, 1985; Wong, 1996; and Broll, Chow and Wong, 2001). In all
these studies, it is implicitly assumed that the competitive ﬁrm is all-equity ﬁnanced.
This assumption may be innocuous in a perfect world in which Modigliani and Miller
(1958) assert that the choice of capital structure (i.e., the mix of debt and equity) is
a matter of irrelevance to the ﬁrm. A corollary to this irrelevance theorem is that the
real and ﬁnancial decisions of the ﬁrm are independent and therefore can be made
separately.
I nt h er e a lw o r l d ,i m p e r f e c t i o n ss u c ha st a xation, bankruptcy, information asym-
metry, and agency costs are a fact of life, thereby making the celebrated Modigliani-
Miller theorem fragile.1 The purpose of this paper is therefore to reconsider the
theory of the competitive ﬁrm under output price uncertainty when the real and ﬁ-
nancial decisions of the ﬁrm are de facto interdependent. To this end, we modify
the tax-adjusted valuation model of Modigliani and Miller (1963) and DeAngelo and
Masulis (1980), and place it in the context of the competitive ﬁrm under output
price uncertainty ` al aSandmo (1971) and Batra and Ullah (1974). The model is
further complicated to shed light on how additional sources of risk, aggregated into
an additive background risk, aﬀect the behavior of the ﬁrm.
Irrespective of the risk attitude of the ﬁrm and the incidence of the multiple sources
1The eﬀects of market imperfections on the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem are studied
by a great many papers. Notable examples are Modigliani and Miller (1963), Miller (1977), and
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) on taxation; Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976), and Brennan
and Schwartz (1978) on bankruptcy; Myers and Majluf (1984), Narayanan (1988), and Noe (1988)
on information asymmetry; Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1981)
on agency costs.Capital Structure 3
of uncertainty, we show that the optimal input mix depends on the optimal debt-
equity ratio, rendering the interdependence of the real and ﬁnancial decisions of the
ﬁrm. Myers (1974), Hite (1977), Cooper and Franks (1983), Dotan and Ravid (1985),
and Dammon and Senbet (1988) establish similar interactions between corporate
investment and ﬁnancing decisions, albeit without considering the risk attitudes of
ﬁrms. We further show that the ﬁrm always chooses its optimal debt-equity ratio to
minimize the weighted average cost of capital. Even though the introduction of the
background risk has no eﬀects on the optimal debt-equity ratio and on the marginal
rate of technical substitution, it does aﬀect the absolute level of input utilization and
t h ea m o u n to fd e b ta n de q u i t yi s s u e db yt h eﬁrm. In particular, we show that the ﬁrm
will acquire less capital by issuing less debt and equity if two reasonable conditions
are met. First, capital is a normal input.2 Second, the utility function of the ﬁrm
satisﬁes standard risk aversion in the sense of Kimball (1990, 1993). Finally, we show
that the presence of the background risk induces the ﬁrm to produce less should the
utility function of the ﬁrm exhibit standard risk aversion and this result is robust to
whether capital is a normal or an inferior input.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop a
model of the competitive ﬁrm under output price uncertainty which fully integrates
the production and capital structure decisions of the ﬁrm. Section 3 characterizes
the optimal input mix and ﬁnancing mix when an independent background risk ex-
ists. Section 4 examines the economic implications of the background risk on the
production and capital structure decisions of the ﬁrm. The ﬁnal section oﬀers some
concluding remarks.
2Bear (1965) deﬁnes a normal (an inferior) input as one for which an increase in output price
results in increased (decreased) utilization of that input.Capital Structure 4
2. The Model
Consider the competitive ﬁrm under output price uncertainty ` al aSandmo (1971)
and Batra and Ullah (1974). The ﬁrm produces a single output, Q, according to
a strictly increasing and concave production function, Q = F(K,L), where K and
L are the levels of capital and labor employed by the ﬁrm, respectively. Unlike
Sandmo (1971) and Batra and Ullah (1974) who assume the output price, ˜ P,b e i n g
the exclusive source of uncertainty, we introduce the ﬁrm to additional sources of
uncertainty which are aggregated into an additive background risk, ˜ Z.3 ˜ P is a strictly
positive random variable, while ˜ Z is a zero-mean random variable independent of ˜ P.
The ﬁrm acquires capital, K, with the proceeds from issuing debt, D, and equity,
E. Shareholders of the ﬁrm have initial wealth, W0,u p o nw h i c hE is contributed to
the ﬁrm as equity capital and the rest, W0 − E,i si n v e s t e di nr i s k l e s sa s s e t se a r n i n g
ar a t eo fr e t u r n ,re. For simplicity, we normalize the price of capital to unity so that
the initial balance sheet of the ﬁrm can be stated as
K = D + E. (1)
Furthermore, we assume that the economic rate of capital depreciation equals one,
thereby yielding zero salvage value of capital. Labor, L,i sh i r e da tak n o w nw a g e
rate, w. The total labor costs, wL, will be paid out of the revenues realized by the
ﬁrm.
Interest costs of debt are assumed to comprise default risk premiums which are
positively related to debt-equity ratios. Throughout the paper we consider only the
case where the ﬁrm never defaults on its debt (i.e., D is suﬃciently small). However,
d u et oal a c ko fb a r g a i n i n gp o w e r ,t h eﬁrm has to encounter a pre-speciﬁed schedule
3Throughout the paper, a tilde (∼)a l w a y ss i g n i ﬁes a random variable.Capital Structure 5
of interest rate, rd(λ), where λ = D/E is the debt-equity ratio of the ﬁrm. We assume
that rd is weakly increasing and convex with rd(0) = re.4 Interest costs of debt are
fully tax-deductible.
The ﬁrm has to pay corporate income taxes to the government at a constant tax
rate, t.T h eﬁrm’s tax liability is given by
˜ T = t( ˜ PQ+ ˜ Z − wL− δK − rdD), (2)
where δ is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc rate of capital depreciation for tax purposes. Thus, the
wealth of the shareholders can be written as
˜ W =(˜ PQ+ ˜ Z − wL) − ˜ T − (1 + rd)D +( 1+re)(W0 − E), (3)
where the ﬁrst term is the operating proﬁts of the ﬁrm, the second term is the
tax liability deﬁned in equation (2), the third term is the debt repayment including
principal and interest, and the ﬁnal term is the proceeds from the investment in
riskless assets.
Using equations (1) and (2), we can write equation (3) as
˜ W =( 1− t)( ˜ PQ+ ˜ Z − wL) − (1 + rk − tδ)K +( 1+re)W0, (4)
where rk is the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of the ﬁrm and is deﬁned
by (see, e.g., Brealey and Myers, 1996; Ross, Westerﬁeld, and Jordon, 1998)







Since the capital structure weights, D/K and E/K, can be expressed as D/K =
λ/(λ +1 )a n dE/K =1 /(λ + 1), inspection of equation (5) reveals that







4These assumptions are motivated by the static trade-oﬀ theory of capital structure. See, e.g.,
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976), Brealey and Myers (1996), and Ross, Westerﬁeld, and
Jordon (1998).Capital Structure 6
and thereby rk af u n c t i o no fλ only.
The ﬁrm possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, U(W), deﬁned
over the wealth of its shareholders, W,w i t hU0 > 0a n dU00 < 0, indicating the
presence of risk aversion. Before any uncertainty is resolved, the ﬁrm chooses an input
mix, (K,L), and a ﬁnancing mix, (D,E), so as to maximize its expected utility:
max
K,L,D,E
E[U( ˜ W)], (7)
subject to the balance sheet identity, (1), where E is the expectation operator with
respect to the joint probability distribution of ˜ P and ˜ Z,a n d ˜ W is deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n
(4).
3. Solution to the Model
Using the balance sheet identity, (1), we can substitute out E in problem (7). To facil-
itate the analysis, we reformulate problem (7) as the following two-stage optimization
problem.
In the ﬁrst stage, we derive the optimal leverage:
D(K,L)=a r gm a x
D
E[U( ˜ W)], (8)
for any given input mix, (K,L) .B a s e do ne q u a t i o n( 8 ) ,w ed e ﬁne the indirect expected
utility, ¯ U(K,L), as E[U( ˜ W)] evaluated at D(K,L). In the second stage, we derive
the optimal input mix:
(K
∗,L
∗)=a r gm a x
K,L
¯ U(K,L). (9)
Substituting equation (9) into equation (8) yields the optimal leverage, D∗ = D(K∗,L ∗),
which completes the solution to problem (7).Capital Structure 7
3.1. Optimal Debt-Equity Ratio





2 =0 , (10)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tλ = D/(K − D). Inspection of equation (10) leads
us to the statement of our ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1. The ﬁrm chooses its optimal debt-equity ratio to minimize its
WACC.
Proof. Since E[U0( ˜ W)] > 0a n dλ ≥ 0, inspection of equation (10) reveals that
r0





(λ +1 ) 2[r
00




(λ +1 ) 3[re − (1 − t)rd(λ)].
Since r0
d ≥ 0a n dr00
d ≥ 0, it follows from the above equation that rk is strictly convex
for small value of λ such that (1−t)rd(λ) <r e. Over this range, equation (6) implies
that rk(λ) <r e.O t h e r w i s e , w e h a v e rk(λ) ≥ re. Hence, the optimal debt-equity
ratio, λ∗,w h i c hs o l v e sr0
k(λ∗) = 0, must be the unique solution that minimizes rk.
2
It should be evident from equation (6) that the optimal debt-equity ratio, λ∗,
depends neither on the risk attitude of the ﬁrm nor on the input mix chosen by the
ﬁrm. It is governed solely by the interest rate schedule, rd, the corporate tax rate,
t,a n dt h ec o s to fe q u i t y ,re. However, since λ = D/(K − D), we have D(K,L)=
λ∗K/(λ∗ + 1). It follows that the optimal leverage does depend on the amount of
capital chosen by the ﬁrm.Capital Structure 8
3.2. Optimal Input Mix
Now, we are ready to fully solve problem (7). By Proposition 1, the optimal debt-
equity ratio, λ∗, is independent of the input mix chosen by the ﬁrm. From equation
(6), the optimal WACC is given by r∗
k = rk(λ∗), which is also independent of the
i n p u tm i xc h o s e nb yt h eﬁrm. Using this fact and equation (9), the optimal input
mix, (K∗,L ∗), are therefore deﬁned by the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
E{U
0( ˜ W
∗)[(1 − t) ˜ PF K(K
∗,L
∗) − 1 − r
∗
k + tδ]} =0 , (11)
E{U
0( ˜ W
∗)(1 − t)[ ˜ PF L(K
∗,L
∗) − w]} =0 , (12)
The second-order conditions are assumed to be satisﬁed.
Rearranging terms, equation (11) becomes
E[U
0( ˜ W






k − tδ). (13)
Likewise, rearranging terms in equation (12) yields
E[U
0( ˜ W




∗)](1 − t)w. (14)








Equation (15) states that, at the optimum, the marginal rate of technical substitution,
which is the ratio of the marginal product of capital and the marginal product of labor,
equals the ratio of the marginal cost of capital and the tax-adjusted wage rate. Since
the marginal cost of capital depends on the optimal debt-equity ratio, λ∗,t h er e a l
and ﬁnancial decisions of the ﬁrm are indeed integrated. The following proposition
summarizes this observation.Capital Structure 9
Proposition 2. The real and ﬁnancial decisions of the ﬁrm are integrated in
that the marginal rate of technical substitution equals the ratio of the marginal cost of
c a p i t a la n dt h et a x - a d j u s t e dw a g er a t e .
4. Implications of Background Risk
In this section, we want to examine the economic implications of the background
risk on the behavior of the ﬁrm. To this end, we consider a benchmark case in which
the background risk does not exist, or equivalently ˜ Z = 0. As such, the decision
problem of the ﬁrm becomes
max
K, L, D
EP[U( ˜ W0)], (16)
where EP is the expectation operator with respect to the probability distribution of
˜ P,a n d ˜ W0 is deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 4 )s u b j e c tt o ˜ Z =0 .
Following Kihlstrom, Romer, and Williams (1981) and Nachman (1982), we deﬁne
the following derived utility function:
V (W)=E Z[U(W + ˜ Z)],
where EZ is the expectation operator with respect to the probability distribution of
˜ Z. Using this derived utility function and applying the law of iterated expectations,
problem (7) can be written as
max
K, L, D
EP[V ( ˜ W0)]. (17)
Note that the background risk, ˜ Z, does not appear directly in problem (17). Com-
paring problem (16) with problem (17) reveals that introducing ˜ Z into problem (16)
is equivalent to replacing the utility function, U, by the derived utility function, V .Capital Structure 10
Although U and V should be closely related, the theory of risk aversion developed
by Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) is too weak to yield any meaningful linkage between
these two utility functions. To resolve this problem, Kimball (1990, 1993) advocates
a stronger, yet canonical, notion of risk aversion known as standard risk aversion.5
He deﬁnes U000 > 0 as prudence and the index, −U000(W)/U00(W), as a local measure
o ft h ed e g r e eo fa b s o l u t ep r u d e n c e .H es h o w s that a strictly increasing and concave
utility function exhibits standard risk aversion if, and only if, it exhibits decreasing
absolute risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense and decreasing absolute prudence. If
the underlying utility function, U, exhibits standard risk aversion, Eeckhoudt and
Kimball (1992) and Kimball (1993) show that the derived utility function, V , will be
more risk averse than U in the usual Arrow-Pratt sense.6
Equipped with this intuitive relationship between U and V ,w er e c o g n i z et h a tt h e
eﬀects of the background risk on the behavior of the ﬁrm should be qualitatively tan-
tamount to those of increased risk aversion. Following Diamond and Stiglitz (1974),
we work with a diﬀerentiable family of utility functions, U(W, ρ), where ρ is an ordinal
index of risk aversion. Given this notation, Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) show that
an increase in ρ represents increased risk aversion if, and only if, the Arrow-Pratt













According to Bear (1965), capital is said to be a normal (an inferior) input if
an increase in the output price increases the utilization of capital. Mathematically,
capital is a normal (an inferior) input if FLFKL − FKFLL > (<)0 .T h ep r o o fo ft h e
5Loosely speaking, standard risk aversion formalizes the intuitive notion that bearing one risk
should make an individual less willing to bear another, even when the two risks are independent.
6Wong (1996) shows further that this result may extend to the case with dependent background
risk.Capital Structure 11
following proposition is relegated to the appendix.
Proposition 3. If capital is a normal input and the ﬁrm’s utility function exhibits
standard risk aversion, then the introduction of the background risk induces the ﬁrm
to acquire less capital by issuing less debt and equity.
Proposition 3 implies that the presence of the background risk induces the ﬁrm
to adopt a lower utilization of capital, thereby a lower degree of leverage, should
capital be a normal input. In this case, we would expect the output level of the ﬁrm
to decrease. However, if capital is an inferior input, we cannot draw such a direct
inference about the output level from Proposition 3. The following proposition, where
a proof can be found in the appendix, shows that the presence of the background risk
is indeed output-reducing.
Proposition 4. If the ﬁrm’s utility function exhibits standard risk aversion, then
the introduction of the background risk induces the ﬁrm to produce less.
Proposition 4 is consistent with the consensus in the literature that uncertainty is
output-reducing (see, e.g., Sandmo, 1971; Batra and Ullah, 1974; Chavas, 1985; and
Wong, 1996).
5. Conclusion
This paper has investigated the interaction between the production and ﬁnancing
decisions of the competitive ﬁrm ` al aSandmo (1971). Besides output price uncer-
tainty, the ﬁrm faces additional sources of risk which are aggregated into an additiveCapital Structure 12
background risk. We have shown that the ﬁrm always chooses its optimal debt-equity
ratio to minimize the weighted average cost of capital, irrespective of the risk attitude
of the ﬁrm and the incidence of the multiple sources of uncertainty. Even though the
introduction of the background risk has no eﬀects on the optimal debt-equity ratio
and the marginal rate of technical substitution, it reduces the output level of the ﬁrm.
Furthermore, if capital is a normal input, the presence of the background risk induces
the ﬁrm to acquire less capital by issuing less debt and equity.
While this paper focuses on a speciﬁc model of production and ﬁnancing decisions
under uncertainty, the methods advanced are completely general. Since multiple
sources of risk is a fact of life, these methods should be applicable to many other
choice problems under uncertainty (see, e.g., Wong, 1997).
Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . We replace the utility function in problem (16) with the
diﬀerentiable family of utility functions, U(W,ρ). By Proposition 1, the optimal debt-
equity ratio, λ∗, is independent of the presence or absence of the background risk,
so is the optimal WACC, r∗
k. Using this fact, the optimal input mix, (K0,L 0), are
therefore deﬁned by the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
HK =E P{UW( ˜ W
0
0,ρ)[(1 − t) ˜ PFK(K
0,L
0) − 1 − r
∗
k + tδ]} =0 , (1)
HL =E P{UW( ˜ W
0
0,ρ)(1 − t)[ ˜ PF L(K
0,L
0) − w]} =0 , (2)
























, (5)Capital Structure 13
where




HLL =E P(UW ˜ P)(1 − t)FLL +E P[UWW(1 − t)
2( ˜ PF L − w)
2], (7)
HKL =E P(UW ˜ P)(1 − t)FKL
+EP{UWW(1 − t)[(1 − t) ˜ PFK − 1 − r
∗
k + tδ]( ˜ PF L − w)}, (8)
HKρ =E P{UWρ[(1 − t) ˜ PF K − 1 − r
∗
k + tδ]}, (9)
HLρ =E P[UWρ(1 − t)( ˜ PF L − w)]. (10)
Using equations (3), (9), and (10), we have
HKρFL = HLρFK. (11)
















By the second-order conditions, we know that HKKHLL−H2
KL > 0. Hence, the signs
of dK0/dρ and dL0/dρ depend on the signs of HLρ and FKL.






where the inequality follows from equation (18). Deﬁne ¯ W0
0 as ˜ W0
0 evaluated at
˜ P = w/FL. Using equation (2), we can write equation (10) as
EP{[R( ˜ W
0




0,ρ)(1 − t)[ ˜ PFL(K
0,L
0) − w]}.
Since R(W,ρ)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nW and ˜ W0
0 is increasing in P, the sign of R( ˜ W0
0,ρ) −
R( ¯ W0
0,ρ) is opposite to that of ˜ PF L(K0,L 0) − w. Thus, the above expression must
be negative, implying that HLρ is unambiguously negative.
If capital is a normal input, we have FLFKL − FKFLL > 0. Equation (12) im-
plies that dK0/dρ < 0. From Proposition 1, the optimal debt-equity ratio is theCapital Structure 14
same irrespective of the presence or absence of the background risk. Thus, we have
dD0/dρ < 0a n dd E0/dρ < 0. This completes our proof. 2














Substituting equations (12) and (13) into the right-hand side of the above equation
yields






Since F(K,L) is strictly concave, we have 2FKFLFKL − F2
KFLL − F2
LFKK > 0 (Sil-
berberg, 1990). It follows from the above expression that dF(K0,L 0)/dρ < 0. This
completes our proof. 2
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